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Abstract: The Bank of Japan permitted a ten-year period of deflation 
(1995-2005) which appears to have ended in 2006.  The deflation, as well 
as the preceding disinflation, adversely affected the financial and real 
sectors of the economy that in turn, made it difficult to recover from the 
collapse of asset prices in 1990 and 1991. Various ad hoc explanations 
have been offered to account for the deflation period.  This paper offers a 
second-best explanation based on a two-player policy game between the 
Bank of Japan and the banking system in which the banking system relies 
on an accommodative policy of forgiveness and forbearance by the 
Ministry of Finance to deal with weak balance sheets.  The paper does not 
explicitly model the Ministry of Finance preference function but 
incorporates the Bank of Japan’s perceived willingness of the Ministry to 
accommodate the banking system in the Bank’s reaction function. The 
model suggests that in the context of established deflationary expectations 
and large amounts of debt, the Bank of Japan explicitly regarded the level 
of debt as exceeding the socially optimal level, that Ministry of Finance 
forgiveness and forbearance contributed to this excess, and lacking an 
instrument to reverse deflationary expectations, the Bank of Japan 
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  11. Introduction 
The Bank of Japan (BoJ) in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s achieved a 
remarkable record of price stability while defying the conventional wisdom that legally 
dependent central banks generated higher inflation rates than legally independent ones 
(Alesina and Summers, 1993).  These years represent the high point of BoJ policy in the 
postwar period and drew widespread academic interest to BoJ policy outcomes and 
central bank institutional design.  In the late 1980s and 1990s, however, the BoJ was 
criticized for accommodating asset inflation and then for a “cold turkey” response to the 
asset bubble in 1989 followed by anemic expansionary policy after 1992 almost 
universally regarded as insufficient to prevent prices from falling (Hetzel, 2003 and 
McCallum, 2003).  In the first half of the 1990s Japan experienced disinflation followed 
after 1994 by a gradual but persistent fall in the price level that only by 2005 showed 
signs of increasing.  The disinflation and deflation adversely impacted the financial and 
real sectors and limited Japan’s ability to recover from the collapse of asset prices in the 
early 1990s via several channels (see Cargill and Parker, 2003 and 2004, for example). 
The deflation period appears to be coming to an end in 2006. Combined with an 
expanding economy, the BoJ on March 9, 2006 announced a gradual end to its zero 
interest rate policy (ZIRP), first established in February 1999, and the quantitative easing 
policy (QEP) initiated as of March 2001.  At the same time the BoJ announced it was 
adopting a price stability objective of ultimately keeping the inflation rate between zero 
and two percent with a focus on the midpoint.  While not a formal inflation target 
framework, the announcement is designed to express the BoJ’s definition of the price 
stability objective in Article 2 of the 1997 Bank of Japan Law. 
  2The failure of the BoJ to prevent deflation and resistance to outside criticism has 
generated much debate between the BoJ and the academic profession, but more important 
for the institutional design of the BoJ, the failure of the BoJ to prevent deflation has 
brought the BoJ into conflict with the Ministry of Finance (MoF), Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi, and the Diet.  The criticism focuses broadly on the entire period of 
monetary policy since 1994 and on concern the BoJ will adopt a too rapid “exit” from the 
QEP in light of the premature shift to tighter policy in August 2000.  Kuttner and Posner 
(2004) present evidence on the ‘scar effects’ of this premature policy.  Prime Minister 
Koizumi in early 2003, prior to selecting a replacement for retiring Governor Masaru 
Hayami, made it clear he expected more aggressive action against deflation and implied 
that an inflation target framework was a possibility.  Even though the Bank’s QEP 
significantly increased in late 2002 and 2003 and the rate of deflation declined, the Bank 
of Japan has still been subject to criticism for past policies, resisting calls for more 
expansionary policy, and resisting an inflation target framework.  This has generated 
interest in modifying the newly enhanced independence achieved in 1998 (Feldman, 
2006).  Heizo Takenaka, minister of Internal Affairs, as recently as December 2006, 
stated that monetary policy is not the sole responsibility of the Bank of Japan (Economist, 
December 17, 2005).  The BoJ’s March announcement might be intended to ford off any 
institutional redesign from the government, especially in the form of an explicit inflation 
target. 
The consequences of the ten-year deflation have been significant both in 
economic and political terms.  The unanswered question to date, however, is why the BoJ 
followed a policy that permitted deflation?  The objective of this paper is to provide a 
  3policy-game interpretation to the BoJ’s deflationary policy as a second best solution from 
the perspective of the BoJ in the context of three unique pre-existing conditions: 
entrenched deflationary expectations, large amounts of private and budget debt, and a 
perceived willingness of the MoF to substitute forgiveness and forbearance for structural 
reform in dealing with troubled financial institutions, especially banks.  This framework 
fits the stylized conditions of the Japanese economy in the 1990s and offers a perspective 
on BoJ policies during the period anchored in optimal behavior on the part of the Bank. 
The remainder of the paper consists of five sections.  Section two summarizes 
various existing explanations to the Bank’s failure to eliminate deflation for so long a 
period.  The policy-game framework is then developed in three steps.  The first in Section 
3 shows that the BoJ has an incentive to deflate in the context of pre-existing deflationary 
expectations and large amounts of debt, incorporating Fisher’s (1933) debt-deflation-
inflation process in the BoJ’s constraint function.  The second step in Section 4 expands 
the framework to include the BoJ’s perceived willingness of the MoF to engage in 
forgiveness and forbearance in dealing with troubled financial institutions.  The third step 
in Section 5 explicitly models how the game between the banks and the BoJ generates a 
BoJ’s reaction function in which deflation is a second-best solution that acts as a 
“disciplining instrument” to limit further increases in real debt.  A concluding section 





  42.  Four Explanations of the Ten-Year Deflation Period 
  There have been various explanations to account for deflation during the past ten 
years which can be labeled the “BoJ view”, the “independence trap”, the “policy error 
trap”, and the “conservative trap” explanations.  While none of these explanations has 
been rigorously framed they have all been offered in various forms as explanations to 
account for the BoJ policy outcomes of the last ten years.  Each is briefly outlined. 
The BoJ at various times has argued it exhausted the potential of its traditional 
instruments of targeting the call rate at zero (ZIRP) and permitting the account balance to 
reach unprecedented levels (QEP) through discounting and open market operations in 
Japan Government Bonds (JGBs).  According to the “Bank’s view”, the ZIRP and QEP 
were not successful because of the structural problems in the real and financial sectors 
and low priced Chinese imports.  Not only would these constraints have prevented 
nontraditional monetary policies such as large scaled purchases of JGBs from being 
effective, nontraditional monetary policy would weaken the Bank of Japan’s capital 
position, expose it to interest-rate risk, and reduce its flexibility to deal with the post-
deflation period (Cargill, 2005).  The “Bank view”, however, has been rejected by the 
majority of researchers who almost universally conclude the BoJ was capable of 
preventing the ten-year deflation process or ending it much sooner.   
Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito (2000) suggest a political economy perspective that 
emphasizes an “independence trap” explanation.  The politics of central bank 
independence in 1997 led to an overly conservative approach on the part of the BoJ and a 
general resistance to outside advice and/or cooperation with the MoF in dealing with 
deflation that would be viewed as inconsistent with the BoJ’s new found legal 
  5independence.  This is a variation of the view that central banks can easily become 
prisoners of their own independence, especially in dealing with extraordinary situations. 
Ito (2004) provides extensive discussion of BoJ policy in the context of its refusal 
to adopt an inflation targeting framework and suggests that lack of understanding or a 
“policy error trap” might offer an explanation. Much of the writings of Posen (1998 and 
2000) also fall into this category.  This view suggests that the BoJ’s decision-making 
process was interrupted by the resignation of the Governor and Deputy Governor in 1998 
over allegations of improper conduct of the Banking Section of the BoJ and then 
followed by the appointment of Masaru Hayami as Governor (until March 2003) who 
lacked understanding about the new financial and monetary environment of Japan and 
focused on nominal rather than real interest rates as indicators of monetary ease.  
The BoJ in the postwar period has been a conservative central bank, partly 
because of the adverse experience with inflation in the 1930s and early 1970s and partly 
because of the conservative position of the central government regarding the budget.  As 
a result, starting in 1973 the BoJ focused on a very low inflation rate --abstracting the 
1990s, and most recently the BoJ announced its definition of price stability as an inflation 
target between zero and two percent with a focus on a one percent rate.  Former Governor 
Hayami in a March 2000 speech offered an even more conservative view and stated:  
“Mainstream thinking now says that price stability should be maintained by a policy 
which prevents inflation from arising in the first place” (Hayami, 2000, p. 6); hence, price 
stability is zero percentage change in the price level.  A low inflation rate (or zero 
inflation rate) in the context of the well-established measurement error in price indexes 
suggests that BoJ policy outcomes may have a tendency to generate mild deflation. 
  6It should be noted that all four of the explanations are reminiscent of the debate 
over the Federal Reserve’s policy outcomes in the 1930s when it permitted prices to 
decline in the first part of that decade.  In that debate the Federal Reserve claimed it had 
done all that was possible and that concern with formal independence, lack of 
understanding, and conservative attitudes were prominent explanations for what is now 
regarded as inappropriate central bank policy. 
The “independence trap”, “policy error trap”, and “conservative trap” offer 
meaningful insights into BoJ policy outcomes; however, they do not exhaust the range of 
possible and plausible explanations. In particular they do not address the following 
critical question connected to the incentives the BoJ faced: could it have been the case 
that the BoJ mildly deflationary monetary policy was the Bank’s optimal response in a 
second-best scenario where critical policy instruments were lacking?  The following three 
sections explore an explanation along those lines in the context of a game between the 
BoJ and commercial banks in a Barro-Gordon framework that suggests the BoJ had 
incentives to generate deflation in the presence of three pre-existing constraints: 
entrenched deflationary expectations, large amounts of private and public debt, and a 
perceived willingness of the part of the MoF to adopt forgiveness and forbearance in 
dealing with troubled financial institutions. 
The three pre-existing conditions seem reasonable given Japan’s macroeconomic 
performance throughout much of the 1990s.  While these three conditions are assumed as 
the background for the model developed in this paper, there is considerable anecdotal 
evidence they are reasonable assumptions. 
  7Entrenched deflationary expectations came to dominate Japanese public attitudes 
by the late 1990s in light of disinflation in the first half of the 1990s and actual deflation 
by all of the price indicators after 1994.  Continued declines in real estate prices and 
employee compensation further contributed to deflationary expectations and most 
important the increasing criticism of the BoJ and scandals in 1998 further contributed to 
the public’s lack of confidence in the ability of the BoJ to reverse the general price 
decline.  The large amounts of private and public debt also become a major feature of the 
Japanese economy in the 1990s with Japan’s ratio of gross government debt to GDP 
being one of the highest among the industrial economies.  There is no doubt the MoF 
along with much of the rest of government has been willing to engage in forgiveness and 
forbearance in dealing with troubled institutions and at times has differed with the BoJ 
over the pace of structural reforms.  
 
3. Deflation as an Optimal Response When Deflationary Expectations are Prevalent 
and the Central Bank Lacks a Sufficient Instrument to Change Expectations 
  
The question this section addresses is the following: could deflation ever be an 
optimal policy response when the central bank lacks the instrument to change pre-
existing deflationary expectations and hence has to take those expectations as given when 
choosing inflation? We formulate the problem in the context of a standard loss function 
framework.  
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  8Where   and   denote the socially optimal levels of real debt and inflation, 
respectively.  Now consider an “expectations-augmented Phillips curve” in which 
unexpected inflation (deflation) reduces (increases) the current level of real debt above 
(below) its socially optimum level. Equation (2) acts as a constraint in the Bank’s 
minimization problem.  
* D
* π
ε π π + − − = − ) ( ) ( ) 2 (
* e D D  
Where   denotes the public’s expectations about the rate of change of the price level 
(inflation if positive; deflation if negative) and 
e π
ε  is an iid shock.  This explicitly 
incorporates the debt-deflation hypothesis of Fisher (1933), since an increase in un-
expected deflation increases real debt beyond its socially optimal level. 
Assuming all variables take positive values, expression (1) and (2) yield the 
standard Barro-Gordon outcome.  In a one-event game the central bank has an incentive 
to inflate and reduce the level of real debt and hence, monetary policy displays an 
“inflation bias”.  The framework can also easily show that the BoJ has a “deflation bias” 
in an environment of pre-existing deflationary expectations, that is, when   is taken 
as given by the BoJ when choosing its optimal policy. 
0 <
e π
  Substituting (2) into (1), differentiating the resulting expression with respect to 


















* e  
In expression (3), set  0 = ε  to focus on the deterministic solution, impose the pre-
existing condition of deflationary expectations ( ), and assume that the socially 





  9This generates the result that the optimal policy is actual deflation ( 0 < π ), as long as the 
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The result in (4) says that deflation will be an optimal policy so long as the socially 
optimal rate of inflation weighted by its relative importance in the BoJ’s loss function is 
strictly less than the (absolute value) of the expected rate of deflation  This result means 
that if the BoJ considers that the socially optimum rate of inflation is indeed low (its 
upper bound being exactly given by (4)), then a policy of deflation can indeed be a best 
response in an environment where there are widespread expectations of continual 
deflation, and the central bank lacks an instrument to change those expectations, so that it 
has to take them as given when setting its optimal policy.  
 
4. The Quest for the Missing Instrument: Deflation as a “Discipline Device”  
 
   The above framework can be extended to incorporate a BoJ perceived view that 
the MoF is prone to policies of forgiveness and forbearance in dealing with troubled 
financial institutions.  This is historically reasonable as the BoJ has generally been more 
supportive of financial liberalization and market solutions than the MoF, which on many 
occasions has attempted to slow the process of liberalization and after 1990 resisted 
greater transparency, market discipline, and departure from the old financial regime. 
  As way of example, consider the following reference to the BoJ’s actions: 
“The Bank seems to be mostly concerned that by creating inflation it might let debtors off 
the hook and thereby reduce the pressure on firms to restructure and on the government 
to make structural reforms. Yet in playing this game the Bank of Japan has failed in its 
primary duty as a central bank: to ensure price stability. Its agenda of pressing for 
structural reform and corporate restructuring, commendable as it is, is outside its 
mandate” (Economist, May 31
st, 2001).  
  10 
To accommodate the analysis that follows, we need to modify the BoJ’s 
preference function regarding deflation and the deviations of the levels of debt relative to 
its socially optimum level, so that the new BoJ’s loss function is now given by: 
0 ; ) ( ˆ ) ˆ , ( ) 5 (
* 2 > − + = c D D c D L π π   
Where π ˆ  now denotes the rate of deflation (taking non-negative values) and .denotes 
the expected rate of deflation (also taking non-negative values). The deviations of real 
debt relative to its socially optimal level now enter the loss function in a linear fashion 
(the technical reason for this will become apparent when we introduce a modified BoJ’s 
constraint function that makes room for deflation to act as a “disciplining device”).   
e π ˆ
The implicit function theorem indicates the BoJ now faces a trade-off between the 
level of real debt and deflation.  In order to reduce the deviations of debt relative to its 
socially optimal level, the BoJ needs to increase deflation because 


















To illustrate the implications of the tradeoff we make a slight but subtle 
modification of expression (2), the constraint function, to permit a disciplining effect 
stemming from deflation --on top of the Fisher revaluation effect already incorporated 
into expression (2).  The deviations of current debt relative to the socially optimal level of 
debt are now expressed in the following quadratic form: 
0 ; ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ) 7 (
2 * > − = − γ π π γ
e D D     
  11In this case, the level of debt is increased relative to its socially optimal level by 
deviations of the deflation rate in either direction.  What is the economic rationale of 
such a formulation?   
  If deflation is lower than expected, the burden of repaying already existing debt 
by troubled banks is reduced. If combined with a lenient policy by the MoF, this leads to 
an increased capacity of troubled banks to secure “soft loans” implicitly guaranteed by 
the MoF. That is, if deflation is less severe than expected, troubled banks can borrow 
more under a lenient MoF and hence, the level of debt exceeds its socially optimal level.  
If deflation is higher than expected this has the potential to generate a debt-deflation 
process per Fisher and hence, the level of debt will also increase relatively to the socially 
optimal level but via a different process than when the deflation is lower than expected.  
In either event, deviations of deflation from the expected rate generate a higher level of 
debt relative to the socially optimal level of debt.   
  The optimal deflation rate from the BoJ’s perspective can be determined by 
substituting (7) into (5) and minimizing the resulting expression relative toπ ˆ , taking 
deflation expectations as given.  Setting the first order condition equal to zero and solving 
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Note that so long as there are expectations of deflation, the BoJ’s optimal response is to 
generate deflation in a less than one-for-one fashion because of the 








  125. Explicit Expression of the BoJ’s Perceived MoF Policy of Forgiveness and 
Forbearance and Equilibrium of the Policy Game 
 
  It remains to be shown that the level of debt will indeed be systematically above 
its socially optimal level from the BoJ’s perspective, even if deflation and expected 
deflation are always the same, and not only as the result of a temporary misalignment 
between the two, as was the case in the previous section. In other words, the distortion 
introduced on the level of debt by the MoF’s policy of forgiveness and forbearance, as 
perceived by the BoJ, needs to be modeled more explicitly.  
5. 1. The BoJ’s best response in the presence of (perceived) forgiveness and 
forbearance   
 
Rewrite expression (6) in the following manner: 
1 0 ; ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ) 9 (
2 * < < − = − b D bD
e π π γ  
Even if ,   so long as b < 1. That is, the BoJ perceives that the level of debt 
is systematically too high because troubled banks borrow too much money encouraged by 
the implicit guarantee of the MoF. Note that in the previous section, the level of debt 
could exceed its socially optimal level only so long as deflation and expected deflation 
differed from each other, but there was no systematic bias. Now, there is an explicit 
‘political distortion’, captured by the parameter b < 1.  
e π π ˆ ˆ =
* D D >
To see how the BoJ’s perception of the existence of a bias on the part of the MoF 
toward forgiveness and forbearance influences BoJ behavior, solve (9) for D, substitute 
the resulting expression into (5), differentiate the resulting expression relative to π ˆ , set 
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the BoJ’s reaction function cushions some of the expected deflation; that is, the BoJ does 
not translate deflationary expectations one-for-one into actual deflation policy. Second, 
the BoJ generates more deflation given the same deflation expectations when the 
perceived policy of forgiveness and forbearance imposes an upward bias on the level of 









. The BoJ uses deflation policy as a “disciplining instrument” at the 
margin. That is, the BoJ internalizes the soft behavior of the MoF toward troubled banks 
and seeks to prevent excessive debt increase on the part of banks: the higher the 
perceived lax attitude of the MoF (the lower the value of b), the more deflation the BoJ 
creates, for a given expected deflation rate.    
  5. 2. Optimization by distressed banks (or where deflationary expectations 
are coming from)   
 
The BoJ’s reaction function given by (10) is an element of the policy game 
between the BoJ and troubled banks and a critical component of the equilibrium of the 
(one stage) game.  What needs to be considered at this point is to account for the 
distressed banks’ best response; that is, will distress banks choose to expect deflation 
when trying to maximize the amount of debt they hold under the lenient supervision of 
the MoF? 
The answer to this question is non-trivial for the framework developed in this 
paper.  If troubled banks choose to maximize equation (7) --after solving it for D-- 
subject to the constraint given by (10), their optimal choice would be  , and thus,  0 ˆ =
e π
  14no equilibrium with deflationary expectations would exist. While this may not be a 
reasonable optimization process for banks (the constraint function of one player does not 
have to be the objective function of another, and vice versa), its possibility suggests that 
deflationary expectations are not an obvious optimal choice of distressed banks in the one 
stage game with the BoJ. However, if distressed banks explicitly incorporate in their 
objective function the notion that the BoJ uses deflation as a means to discipline debt 
behavior by troubled banks, then a deflationary Nash equilibrium becomes possible in 
which distressed banks optimally choose to expect deflation in their maximization 
problem. 
This can be illustrated by considering the following maximization process for 
distressed banks. Private, distressed banks take (10) as given and choose the expected 
deflation rate that maximizes the following function: 
  +∞ < < − − = Δ − − φ
φ
π
π π 0 ;
ˆ
) ˆ ˆ (
2
1
) 11 ( 0 0
2 D D D
e
e  
  The second addend in expression (11) shows that distressed banks internalize the 
BoJ’s use of deflation as a “discipline device” (i.e., the initially prevailing level of debt is 
being reduced by the mere existence of deflationary expectations). In terms of notation in 
expression (11),   denotes the stock of debt outstanding at the time of the 




φ  is an “attenuation parameter” indicating to what a degree the usage of 
deflation as a “discipline device” to moderate debt increases is attenuated, in the 
perception of troubled banks.  When  +∞ → φ , the perception of deflation as a “discipline 
device” is heavily attenuated and tends to carry no weight in distressed banks’ 
  15optimization problem.  Conversely, when  0 → φ , there tends to be no attenuation and the 
perception of deflation as a “discipline device” by the BoJ plays a dominant role in 
distressed banks’ optimization problem.  
Substituting expression (10) into expression (11), differentiating the resulting 
expression for , setting it equal to zero and solving for   generates the following 











That is, troubled banks come to anticipate deflation based on their understanding 
of the BoJ’s policy.  In the case where there is no upward bias in the level of debt induced 








= , which implies a lower expected deflation on the part of troubled banks. 
Thus, troubled banks internalize the BoJ strategy of deflation as a “discipline device”, 
recognizing the implicit heterogeneity of preferences between the BoJ and the MoF on 
the optimal level of debt and the consequent strategic behavior of the BoJ regarding the 
actions of the MoF --captured by equation (9).   
  Also note that when attenuation is high (that is, when  +∞ → φ ), the optimal 
choice by distressed banks implied by (12) is:  . When high attenuation is coupled 
with perfect foresight expectations ( ), zero deflation becomes the Nash 
equilibrium of the one-shot game, since equation (5), the loss function of the BoJ, 
collapses to  , with the implication that the optimal choice is given by 
0 ˆ →
e π
e π π ˆ ˆ =
* 2 ) 1 ( ˆ D b c − + π
0 ˆ = π .   
 
  16 
6. Concluding Comments 
This paper offers an explanation for the ten-year period of deflation in Japan that 
stresses the incentives faced by the BoJ when making decisions in a second-best scenario 
where various policy instruments could have been missing.  The approach consists of a 
policy game within what Drazen (1999) calls the “new political economy” branch of 
macroeconomics.  In particular, this paper stresses the importance of three pre-existing 
distortions in shaping BoJ’s incentives: entrenched deflationary expectations, large 
amounts of outstanding debt, and a perceived MoF preference for a policy of forgiveness 
and forbearance toward troubled banks.    
 The explanation suggested in this paper complements (rather than substitute) 
existing explanations that try to make sense of BoJ policy during the ten year period of 
deflation in Japan. While lack of understanding on the part of the BoJ, concerns with 
protecting formal independence, and overly conservative views about price stability 
might be part of the explanation for the ten-year period of deflation in Japan, they do not 
focus on understanding what shaped the incentives facing the BoJ when making its 
monetary policy decisions.  
This paper offers a straightforward analytical framework that provides some 
insight by modeling the deflation period as a rational second-best solution to a one-stage 
policy game between the BoJ and troubled banks, which in the perspective of the BoJ 
rely on MoF forgiveness and forbearance as a policy to deal with weak balance sheets.  
Two caveats are in order, however. 
  17First, the model does not incorporate an explicit preference function for the MoF, 
but rather adopts a shortcut that incorporates the influence of the MoF on the BoJ actions 
via the BoJ constraint function, by modeling how the BoJ perceives the MoF bias toward 
“too much debt, too little reform.” This modeling strategy simplifies the analytical 
problem at hand, avoiding the need to model a three players’ game. While the cost paid is 
that the MoF behavior and motivation are left unexplained, the model still offers a 
reasonable explanation of why the BoJ permitted deflation for such a long period of time: 
an upward bias on the level of debt permitted by a policy of MoF forgiveness and 
forbearance (as perceived by the BoJ) induces the Bank to use deflation policy as a 
“disciplining instrument”. 
The modeling approach presented in this paper is based on the same 
conceptualization of macroeconomic performance as the outcome between game playing  
between policy makers recently suggested by Nordhaus and Hoshi. Nordhaus (1994) 
provides a formalization of the game played between the monetary and fiscal authorities 
and shows that a lack of coordination between them leads to both a higher budget deficit 
and a higher interest rate than either authority considers optimal. Hoshi (2004) models the 
non-cooperative equilibrium between the central bank and the bank supervisor and finds 
that in equilibrium a lack of coordination leads the monetary authority to pay too much 
attention to bank supervision and to choose a monetary policy that is too tight relative to 
the one that would prevail in the case when policies are coordinated. Our paper explores 
the strategic interaction that has, so far, been left unexplored: the one between the BoJ 
and troubled banks that are not under the Bank’s supervision and by doing so sheds new 
light on a very important policy problem.  
  18A second caveat is related to the assumption that the BoJ directly controls the rate 
of inflation. As forcefully argued by Blinder (1998), this assumption is unrealistic as a 
description of the monetary policy-making process and should always be kept in mind. 
The rationale for the use of the assumption in this paper relies on a cost-benefit 
relationship between the model and trying to account for BoJ behavior in an optimizing 
framework.  The perspective offered in this paper that incentives faced by a central bank 
in a second-best world generates suboptimal macroeconomic performance and the 
applicability to the BoJ in the recent past seems wroth the tradeoff. 
An obvious question that emerges from the framework in this paper is to what 
degree it can be used to excuse the BoJ for permitting deflation in violation of Article 1 
of the 1997 Bank of Japan Law and the adverse effects of deflation on the economy for 
such a long period in Japan.  The Bank of Japan likely exceeded its role in the Japanese 
economy as specified in the 1997 Bank of Japan Law in pursuing its agenda of inducing 
“more reform and less debt” while simultaneously ignoring its main goal of preserving 
price stability by using deflation as a “disciplining instrument.” The pre-existing 
distortions modeled in this paper provide an understanding of the Bank’s actions from a 
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